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THE SPECTER OF DARLINGTON-RESTRICTIONS
ON AN EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO MAKE A
CHANGE IN HIS BUSINESS OPERATIONS
CLIFFORD S. BART*
PAUL J. KINGSTON**
I. INTRODUCTION
Confusion now bath made his masterpiece.
—Shakespeare
These words might well have been uttered by an attorney trying
to make his way through the mass of detail, opinions, appendages, and
rulings which comprises this country's labor law. As confusing as the
problems may seem, they are still fascinating and, of course, of vital
interest. One of the major issues which now concerns the labor bar
involves the "subcontracting-closing" problem.
This issue involves important questions of statutory interpretation
as well as a balancing of social and economic factors of the greatest
magnitude. Representatives of management and labor have repeatedly
stepped into the legal arena to do battle before the National Labor
Relations Board, circuit courts and the Supreme Court in their efforts
to resolve the conflict.
Stated simply, the question is whether and to what extent an
employer must bargain about proposed changes in his business prior
to implementing them. At what point does a change in a business opera-
tion become a shut-down? What is required of an employer before he
can make a change? May he merely notify the union; must he discuss
the matter with them; must he acquiesce in the views of the union? Are
there instances where he may act unilaterally?
The intent of this article is to draw some of these loose ends
together and define the law as it stands today. Then, with the temerity
that only one versed in labor law can know, an attempt will be made to
predict the direction which the law will follow.
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW PRIOR TO TOWN & COUNTRY
Sections 8(a) (5) and 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act
provide:
* A.B., St. Lawrence University, 1958• LL B, Columbia University, 1961; LL.M.,
Georgetown University, 1964; Member, New York Bar; Attorney, National Labor
Relations Board, Brooklyn, New York.
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It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer .. .
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees. .. 1
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively
is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the nego-
tiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession. . . . 2
The problems presented by these few words are enormous. Who
are the "representatives of his employees"? What is bargaining? What
constitutes a "refusal"? Refuse to bargain about what? Subcontract-
ing? Partial closing? Complete closing? Automation? When must the
employer bargain? For how long? When does the bargaining relation-
ship end?
A look at some of the early Board decisions which construed these
statutory provisions proves illuminating. In Timken Roller Bearing
Co: the Board affirmed a Trial Examiner's decision which held that
section 8(a) (5) required an employer to discuss the practice of sub-
contracting certain production and maintenance work which was
identical to the work done by unit employees which the union repre-
sented. The Trial Examiner found that the employer had an established
practice of subcontracting this work, and that the union requested
discussion on the matter, but that the employer refused on the ground
that subcontracting was exclusively a management function. In reject-
ing the employer's contentions, the Trial Examiner stated:
[I]t seems apparent that the respondent's system of sub-
contracting work may vitally affect its employees by
progressively undermining their tenure of employment in
removing or withdrawing more and more work, and hence
more and more jobs, from the unit.... It is the respondent's
duty to sit down and discuss these matters with the Union
when requested to do so. During such discussion it may
develop, for example, that the Union will engage to supply
sufficient skilled labor in the crafts in question, so that more
work may be done by the respondent's employees and less by
1 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 	 158(a)(5) (1964).
2 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 	 158(d) (1964).
s 70 N.L.R.E. 500 (1946).
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workers outside the unit . . . or some other and presently
unthought of solution agreeable to both parties may suggest
itself ....
On none of the issues now dividing the parties is the
respondent compelled to reach an agreement with the
Union .. . . The requirement is that the respondent consult
with the Union ... . 4 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Board required an employer merely to consult with a
recognized union before making changes which would eliminate jobs.
There was no premium placed on reaching agreement.
Subsequent cases touched on the issues involved without meeting
them squarely. In Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 5 the employer
abolished its circulation department and created a system of indepen-
dent distributions. The Board found this change in operations was not
based on economic considerations, but was implemented for the illegal
purpose of avoiding the obligation to deal with the union. The dis-
charged employees were ordered reinstated, and the employer was
ordered to revert to the former system of distribution. The Fifth Cir-
cuit denied enforcement of the Board's order,' finding the evidence in-
sufficient to support its conclusions with respect to discriminatory in-
tent. The court never considered the possibility that the 8(a)(5)
violation could exist apart from a finding of illegal motivation.
III TOWN & COUNTRY
In a critical refinement of policy, the Board set down the rule in
Town & Country Mfg. Co? that an employer must bargain about a
decision to subcontract part of his operations, despite legitimate
economic motivation. In this case, the employer was a manufacturer
of mobile home trailers and maintained his own trucking operations
to make delivery of the trailers. When confronted by a union, he
exercised what he considered to be "management prerogative," dis-
charged his drivers, and subcontracted the hauling without notifying
the union of his decision.
The Board found that the subcontract was discriminatorily moti-
vated and constituted a violation of section 8(a)(5) even though it
may have been for purely economic motives:
[T]he elimination of unit jobs, albeit for economic reasons,
is a matter within the statutory phrase "other terms and
conditions of employment" and is a mandatory subject of
4 Id. at 518.
5 101 NI.,.R.B. 1208 (1952), enforcement denied, 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
Ibid.
T 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
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collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5)
of the Act. Moreover, the duty to bargain about a decision
to subcontract work does not impose an undue or unfair bur-
den upon the employer involved. This obligation to bargain
in nowise restrains an employer from formulating or effectu-
ating an economic decision to terminate a phase of his busi-
ness operations. Nor does it obligate him to yield to a union's
demand that a subcontract not be let, or that it be let on
terms inconsistent with management's business judgment.
Experience has shown, however, that candid discussion of
mutual problems by labor and management frequently results
in their resolution with attendant benefit to both sides Busi-
ness operations may profitably continue and jobs may be pre-
served. Such prior discussion with a duly designated bargain-
ing representative is all that the Act contemplates. But it
commands no less.' (Emphasis added.)
Having found that the employer terminated its hauling operations
and discharged the drivers for anti-union reasons, the Board ordered
abrogation of the subcontract, resumption of the hauling operations as
before, and reinstatement of the drivers discharged. Interestingly, and
consistent with the finding of the section 8(a)(5) violation, the Board
stated that it would have taken the same action even if the employer
as a matter of fact was motivated solely by economic considerations.9
Subsequently, the principles enunciated in Town & Country were
applied in a series of cases which were important both for their treat-
ment of remedy and for the expansion of the Town & Country prin-
ciples to new situations.
In Adams Dairy, Inc.," a decision which proved to be of singular
significance, the employer sold the delivery phase of his business to
independent distributors, and discharged his driver-salesmen, without
bargaining with the union about the decision. Citing Town & Country,
the Board found a violation of section 8(a) (5) and, without deciding
whether the discharge was also violative of section 8(a) (3), ordered
the employer to reinstate the driver-salesmen with back pay. The
Board viewed this case as falling within the Town & Country doc-
trine, since the unilateral decision, although not a decision to "sub-
contract," resulted in the elimination of unit work."
Id. at 1027.
9 Id. at 1027-28.
to 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), modified and enforced in part, 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir.
1963), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 644 (1965), modified, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
U Accord, Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964); American
Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), enforced in part, 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965), modi-
fied on remand, 156 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1966), discussed at pp. 75-76 infra. In the latter
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In Renton News Record," a group of newspaper publishers, in
order to meet competitive demands, formed a separate corporation to
purchase a press. They then formed a second corporation which would
operate the press. These two new corporations printed the newspapers,
eliminating the jobs of composing room employees, while the publishers
themselves engaged only in commercial printing. There was no notice
afforded the union either of the change in operations or its effects on
the employees. The Board found that neither of the two newly formed
corporations was an alter ego of the publishers, thus excusing them
from any unfair labor practices, but found the publishers in violation
of section 8(a)(5). No violation of section 8(a)(3) was found. The
Board considered the case a combination of contracting out and auto-
mation, amounting to a change in the method of operations resulting
from technological improvements. The emphasis, however, was on the
"automation" rather than the "contracting out,'" 3 the latter being
considered only the vehicle used in effectuating the decision to auto-
mate. Were the method of operations not so changed, the employers
would have been forced out of business. Clearly a capital investment
was undertaken, yet the fact that jobs were being eliminated was suf-
ficient to impose the obligation to bargain. Indeed, considering Town
& Country as focusing on job elimination, the decision to automate,
thereby replacing men with machines, is no different in kind from a
decision to subcontract, replacing men with men. It should be noted
that the Board did not order a return to the status quo ante, nor did
it order bargaining over future changes, since the decision to change
the operations was impelled by economic survival, the change involved
parties not involved in the unfair labor practice proceedings," and
such an order would have been punitive rather than remedial. The
respondents were ordered, however, to bargain about the effects of
the decision.'
In contrast to Renton News, the Board in Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc."' ordered bargaining not only about the effects of the employer's
unilaterally discontinued cheese operations, which resulted in the elim-
ination of unit jobs, but also about their resumption. Distinguishing
Renton News in this regard, the Board pointed to the employer's past
case, the Board ordered resumption of the unilaterally discontinued trucking operations,
the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of that remedy, and, on remand, the Board deleted
the restoration requirement from its order.
12 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
13 Id. at 1297.
14 See generally Assonet Trucking Co., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 35 (1965); Savoy Laundry
Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 38 (1964), modified, 327 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1964).
15 See also Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 950 (1964), enforced in part, 359
F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1966). In that case even though the Board found a violation of sec-
tion 8(a) (5), abrogation of the subcontracts was not ordered.
10 147 N.L.R.B. 788 (1964).
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unfair labor practices, the absence of innocent third-party interests,
and the fact that the unilateral change was not compelled by economic
necessity. "Practical considerations," however, militated against order-
ing the employer to restore the abolished operations. These considera-
tions included the nature of the business, the probability that dis-
charged employees would be placed elsewhere in the business, and the
possibility that the abolished operations were outmoded.
Continuing to focus on the concept of elimination of unit jobs,
the Board in Hawaii Meat Co." declared an employer in violation of
section 8(a) (5) when he subcontracted, without bargaining, work
which previously had been performed by employees who were then on
strike. Noting that the right of an employer to replace his strikers was
settled by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.,'
the Board stated that "in this case, individual strikers are not being
replaced by other employees, but instead, the positions they held be-
fore the strike have been eliminated so that no replacement is being
substituted for the striker."" Without finding any section 8(a) (3)
violation, the Board then ordered "that the Respondent must be re-
quired to discontinue any arrangement involving the contracting out
of its delivery operations and to reestablish this operation as it existed
on July 1, 1960.'0 Here, then, although there was a substitution of
men for men via subcontract, no economic motive was present, at least
in terms of saving labor costs, and the Board found an 8(a) (5) obli-
gation.
There were certain situations, however, in which the Board felt
that no bargaining was necessary. Among these were instances where
the union representative had seen the movement to equipment incident
to the subcontract but had not requested bargaining," where the em-
ployer's "overall conduct, both prior and subsequent to the execution
of the subcontracting agreement" was fair and honest," and where
there was no "significant detriment" to the employees in the bargaining
unit and there was a past practice of subcontracting not previously
objected to by the union."
11 139 N.L.1213. 966 (1962), enforcement denied, 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963).
18 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
19 139 N.L.R.B. at 969. Compare Empire Terminal Warehouse Co., 151 N.L.R.B.
1359 (1965), enforced sub nom. Dallas Gen. Drivers Union, Local 745 v. NLRB, 355 F2d
842 (D.C. Cu'. 1966); Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 283 (1964); Shell Chem Co, Div. of
Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 298 (1964).
20 139 N.L.R.B. at 971.
21 Motoresearch Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 1490 (1962). See also White Consol. Indus., Inc.,
154 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (1965).
22 Hartmann Luggage Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1572, 1573 (1964). See also United In-
dustrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F2d 183 (5th Cir.
1965), 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1025 (1966); Georgia-Pacific Corp., 150 N.L.RB.
885 (1965).
23 Kennecott Copper Corp. (Chino Mines Div.), 148 N.L.R.B. 1653 (1964). See
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In William I. Burns Ina Detective Agency, Inc.," which did not
involve subcontracting, but instead the partial termination of the em-
ployer's business, the Board felt that the Town & Country principles
were also applicable. In that case, the employer furnished guard ser-
vices throughout the United States. He had had several contracts in the
Omaha, Nebraska area, and all but the one with Creighton University
had been terminated. The company solicited the cancellation of that
account after a cost analysis indicated that it would be unprofitable to
continue operations in Omaha with only one contract. The employer
failed to bargain with the union. The Board found such failure to con-
stitute a violation of section 8(a) (5) and ordered the employer to bar-
gain about both the effects of the cancellation on the employees and
the resumption of the prior operations. It also ordered back pay for
the guards dismissed from Creighton University.
The Board was confronted with a new problem in Burns: sub-
contracting without prior notice is violative of section 8(a) (5), but is
a failure to afford advance notice of a partial termination of a business
likewise violative? In the former situation, the employer merely sub-
stitutes others for his own employees while continuing that portion of
his business. In the latter case, however, there is not substitution, but
elimination. Burns Detective Agency did not continue its services in
any way at Creighton University; it left the performance of guard
services to whomever should successfully bid for that contract with the
University itself. Yet the Board did not make this distinction, al-
though such a distinction would have become critical at the court
leve1. 25 Member Leedom would have found a violation of section
8(a) (5) simply because of the failure to bargain over the effects of the
cancelled contract, and Member Jenkins would have so found only be-
cause the contract was cancelled during negotiations with the union,
an act which supported a finding of bad faith bargaining.'
In a similar case, Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 27 the employer
operated his plant in two separate buildings. All employees were rep-
resented by a single bargaining unit. Without prior notice to the union,
the company shut down one of the two buildings, having decided to
sell to the local housing authority. In finding that the employer had
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (Bettis Lab.), 153 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1965); Allied Chem. Corp.,
151 N.L.R.B. 718 (1965), enforced, 358 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1966); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. (Mansfield Plant), 150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965); General Motors Corp., Buick-Olds-
mobile-Pontiac Assembly Div., 149 N.L.R.B. 396 (1964).
24 148 N.L.R.B. 1267 (1964), enforced in part, 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965).
25 The Eighth Circuit noted that Burns' action in no way constituted a subcontract,
but was a complete withdrawal. 346 F.2d at 902 n.2.
26 148 N.L.R.B. at 1268 n.2.
27 148 N.L.R.B. 545 (1964), remanded, 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965), aff'd on remand,
152 N.L.R.B. 619 (1965).
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violated section 8(a)(5) by failing to bargain about the decision, the
Board stated:
Had Respondent consulted with the Union in this case, the
latter at least would have been able to negotiate concerning
effects on employees of Respondent's decision AO close down
the operations, rather than devoting its energies and atten-
tion to the establishment of phantom rates of pay and condi-
tions of employment. Moreover, the Union might have been
able to advance a solution to the problems confronting Re-
spondent, however remote that possibility may have been.
It is not necessary that a satisfactory solution to the serious
issues involved in a closedown of operations be the probable
result of bargaining negotiations for the obligation to give
notice and opportunity for discussion of such matter to be a
viable and intrinsic part of the statutory bargaining obliga-
tion.2s
The Board then ordered the employer to give back pay to em-
ployees affected by the closedown until they secured substantially
equivalent employment elsewhere, but not past the date on which
the premises were to be turned over to the housing authority. The
Board viewed the employer's action here as a partial cessation of
business and had no difficulty in finding an obligation to bargain in
such circumstances. 29 Again, the elimination of unit jobs was the
touchstone.
The Board had occasion to consider the bargaining obligation
incident to a complete termination of a business in Star Baby Co.3°
and found violations of sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the act. The
sections 8(a) (1) and (3) violations were predicated on a finding that
the purpose of the shutdown was to avoid the union, and therefore the
layoffs incident to the shutdown were discriminatory. The section
8(a)(5) violation stemmed from a unilateral termination without
consulting the union concerning the decision to terminate. Town &
Country was cited by the Board in finding the violation. Since the
employer was no longer in business, the Board did not order the re-
sumption of operations, nor the reinstatement of discharged employees
Instead, they ruled that should operations be resumed, the discharged
employees were to be offered immediate reinstatement, with back pay
from the time of the dissolution of the business until they could secure
28 148 N.L.R.B. at 547.
29 See also Weingarten Food Center, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 256 (1962).
3o 140 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963), enforced as modified sub nom. N.L.R.B. v. Neiderman,
334 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1964). The Second Circuit did not find it necessary to determine
whether a complete cessation of business was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
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substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. The Board was con-
scious of the unusual nature of its back pay remedy, since normally
an employer may terminate his back pay liability by reinstating the
employees; in this case, however, "the employer's inability to end the
back pay by rehiring the employees is the direct result of the em-
ployer's own unlawful conduct in discriminatorily terminating his
business.""
What, then, is the obligation, the burden, placed on the employer
in these situations? For the purpose of this discussion, it might be
worthwhile to treat the obligation in a truncated manner, with an
emphasis on what is not required. Contrary to some assertions, "this
obligation neither restrains an employer from formulating or effectuat-
ing an economic decision to terminate a phase of his business nor
obligates him to yield to a union's demand that a subcontract not be
let."' The word "yield" is critical. As the Board emphasized in Town
& Country, the obligation does not require the employer to change his
mind or to let a subcontract "on terms inconsistent with management's
business judgment."" The object is to create an atmosphere condu-
cive to a solution that will 'permit the continuation of a harmonious
relationship. A solution may be arrived at whereby the employer's
business may continue to prosper while employees retain their jobs.
The Board found the mediatory effect of such discussion a vital factor
in their Town & Country decision. They quoted with approval a state-
ment of Archibald Cox wherein the noted labor law professor stated:
Participating in [collective bargaining] debate often
produces changes in a seemingly fixed position either because
new facts are brought to light or because the strengths or
weaknesses of the several arguments become apparent. Some-
times the parties hit upon some novel compromise of an issue
which has been thrashed over and over. Much is gained even
by giving each side a better picture of the strength of the
other's convictions. The cost is so slight that the potential
gains easily justify legal compulsion to engage in the discus-
sion."
The duty to bargain is, of course, not quite as simple as it may at
first appear. Not only must an employer discuss his proposed business
change, but he must discuss it in "good faith." It is this latter require-
ment which might cause the casual observer to become disturbed by
34 140 N.L.R.B. at 684.
32 Address by Board Member Fanning, Ninth Annual Institute on Labor Law,
Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas, October 19, 1962.
33 Town & Country Mfg. Co., supra note 7, at 1027.
34 Id. at 1027 n.9, quoting Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L.
Rev. 1401, 1412 (1958).
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the Board's Town & Country doctrine, for the Board has stated that
the parties must evince "a sincere desire to resolve differences and
reach a common ground!'" Thus the question arises: in evincing this
"sincere desire" to reach a "common ground," must the employer in
fact alter his position? Assuming, arguendo, that there may be certain
bargaining situations in which the employer must negotiate with an
open mind, Town & Country does not seem to be one of those situa-
tions. It would appear that an employer can enter into a bargaining
conference similar to that in Town & Country with his decision made
before he entered the room." Good faith bargaining in these confer-
ences would seem to require no more of the employer than listening to
the union's proposals, examining them with the union, and sincerely
considering them. Whether the discussion was in fact sincere would
depend on the overall facts of the case and "the totality of [the em-
ployer's] . . . conduct.""
That the Board so construes the employer's obligation is clear
from the language in Town & Country itself. This construction was
later asserted in the Board's brief in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, wherein they defined the employer's duty in the following
manner:
He must hear in good faith any union arguments for a
contrary policy. Alternatives must be explored. Then either
the employer and union will agree or the employer will make
its decision and the union may resort to self-help."
Thus, after considering this facet of the Board's delineation of
the employer's obligation, one may conclude that even in the area
where an employer must discuss proposed business changes with his
employees' bargaining representative, he may still make the business
decision he considers most suitable without committing an unfair labor
practice.
IV. FIBREBOARD
It is in the context of these developments that one of the most
important cases in the 8(a)(5) area—Fibreboard Paper Products"—
must be considered. In Fibreboard, the union had for many years rep-
resented a unit of fifty maintenance employees. In 1960 the employer
35 General Elec Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 196 (1965).
38 See Note, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1100, 1104 (1964). Whether this position is well
taken is certainly open to debate.
37 General Elec. Co., supra note 35, at 197. See Cumberland Shoe Corp., 156
N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1966).
38 Brief for Respondent, p. 50, Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203 (1964).
ao Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), rev'd on rehearing, 138
N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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concluded a study of the feasibility of contracting out this work. The
study showed that the employer could save $225,000 annually by sub-
contracting his maintenance operations. Accordingly, the decision was
made to subcontract the work. When the union attempted to reopen
the existing contract for negotiations, the employer refused on the
grounds that any negotiations would be useless in view of the proposed
change in operations. The employer did agree, however, to discuss the
effects of the change. The union filed an 8(a)(5) charge alleging a
refusal to bargain about the decision to subcontract.
The Board initially considered the problem in 1961. A majority
of the panel found that the employer had not violated the act. They
reasoned that although section 8(a) (5) of the act is extremely broad
and protects employee rights arising from the employment relationship,
whether the claim for them is made before or after the termination of
the employment relationship, the coverage only extends to matters
growing out of an existing bargaining unit. Where, as in Fibreboard,
the discussion would only relate to the question of whether there
should be any unit, the employer might choose to dispense with bar-
gaining. When the employment relationship comes to an end there can
be no "condition of employment" to discuss. "Here ... no employees
remained in the unit to be represented by the Union, and thus there
necessarily could be no impact on the employment conditions of em-
ployees remaining in the unit."" (Emphasis added.)
Member Fanning issued a strong dissenting opinion. He argued
that in the Timken Roller Bearing case,' the Board held that sub-
contracting is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining prior to
the institution of any change and that the employer should not be re-
lieved of this duty to bargain while the unit exists. He found support
for his view in a Supreme Court decision interpreting a section of the
Railway Labor Act.42 In Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry.,43 the Court had construed "working conditions" under the
Railway Labor Act to include the abolition of unit work, against which
the union had a right to protect itself via the strike. Thus, if "working
conditions" under the Railway Labor Act includes the possible loss of
unit jobs, it must have the same meaning under the National Labor
Relations Act. Timken, according to Member Fanning, only served to
reinforce this view.
With the Board's apparent reversal of policy in Town & Country
a year later, both the charging union and the Board's General Counsel
petitioned for reconsideration of the decision in Fibreboard. The peti-
40 130 N.L.R.B. at 1561.
41 Supra note 3.
42 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. {{ 151-88 (1964).
43 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
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tion was granted, and, in a 2-1 decision, the Board ruled that the em-
ployer had violated the act by failing to bargain with the union with
respect to the decision to subcontract the maintenance work.
In a dissenting opinion, Member Rodgers attacked the majority's
holding as one which would stifle management. He felt that a basic
management right had been taken away—the right of a businessman
"to make those economic decisions necessary to the improvement, or
indeed the survival, of the business concern with which [he] ... is iden-
tified."" The majority answered this contention by specifically stating
that the only duty imposed on the employer is to bargain in good faith;
he can still reach the same decision with respect to the proposed
change.
The court of appeals affirmed the Board's decision." The court,
speaking through Judge Burger, held that the decision fell within the
realm of the Board's expertise and that it merely constitutes a part of
the Board's role in fashioning a system of industrial self-government
within the "framework" of the National Labor Relations Act.
After a petition for rehearing was denied, the employer filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari. The writ was granted, and the Supreme
Court had before it a case which, in the words of NLRB counsel, "im-
pinges, in its broadest aspects, upon some of the most difficult and
most important questions of labor-management relations!'"
The Court agreed unanimously that the Board's order should be
upheld." The majority found that subcontracting of this type fell well
within the meaning of "terms and conditions of employment" about
which an employer must bargain under section 8(d) of the act, and
noted the Board's holding in Timken with approval. It would there-
fore appear that the majority extended the obligation to bargain with
respect to the effects of a decision to include bargaining with respect
to the decision itself. Whether the latter follows from the former may
be questionable, since the interests involved are so wholly different.
The majority apparently noticed this possible incongruity, for they
go on to severely limit the scope of their decision:
The Company's decision to contract out the maintenance
work did not alter the Company's basic operation . . . No
capital investment was contemplated; the Company merely
replaced existing employees with those of an independent con-
tractor to do the same work under similar conditions of em-
44 138 N.L.R.B. at 557.
45 322 F.2d 411 (DC. Cir. 1963).
46 Brief for Respondent, Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964).
47 Though the Court unanimously affirmed, Mr. Justice Goldberg took no part in
the• decision and three other justices joined in a separate concurring opinion.
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ployment. Therefore, to require the employer to bargain
about the matter would not significantly abridge his freedom
to manage the business." (Emphasis added.)
The Court also emphasized that these matters, like those in Tim-
ken, are peculiarly susceptible to solution in the "mediatory" atmo-
sphere of collective bargaining. Thus the Court limited itself to the
facts of the instant case and did not consider the broad problems
presented by subcontracting."
The concurring opinion attempts to supply answers omitted by
the majority. Mr. Justice Stewart, who wrote the concurring opinion,
considered the majority holding to be limited to the instance where em-
ployees in a bargaining unit are replaced by those of a subcontractor
doing the same work under similar conditions. He would restrict the
duty to bargain on "conditions of employment" to those instances
where the managerial decision is aimed primarily at these conditions:
Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital
and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves
primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect
of the decision may be necessarily to terminate employ-
ment .... [T]hose management decisions which are funda-
mental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or
which impinge only indirectly upon employment security
should be excluded from that area.' (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Justice Stewart points to the liquidation of a business or the
purchase of labor-saving machinery as examples of acts not primarily
aimed at conditions of employment. He finds the type of subcontract-
ing in the instant case a mandatory subject of bargaining because it
merely involved the replacement of one group of workers by another.
Thus, this was an act aimed directly at conditions of employment.
After Fibreboard, the Board continued to find violations in tradi-
tional Fibreboard situations." The Board also continued to develop
a doctrine which excused a failure to bargain prior to a change in
operation when the employer's overall conduct indicated good faith.
48 379 U.S. at 213.
49 As the Chief Justice stated:
We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to hold,
as we do now, that the type of "contracting out" involved in this case—the
replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an inde-
pendent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment
—is a statutory subject of collective bargaining under 4 8(d). Our decision need
not and does not encompass other forms of "contracting out" or "subcontracting"
which arise daily in our complex economy. (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 215.
89 Id. at 223.
81 See, e.g., Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.13. 1658 (1965).
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The Board first took this view in Hartmann Luggage Co.' and used
Hartmann as support for a finding that the failure to discuss the termi-
nation of part of a business did not constitute a violation." New York
Mirror" is probably the most striking example of this unusual ap-
proach of the Board. In the Mirror case, the employer entered into
secret negotiations for the sale of its business, a newspaper, to a com-
peting newspaper. The employer realized that the sale would result in
a total shut-down. After negotiations were completed, the company
gave notice of the sale to every employee and union involved. This
was the first notice any of the unions had received. Over 1300 em-
ployees were laid off. Most of the unions then had representatives
contact the employer's general manager. Although some mention was
made of the failure to discuss the matter prior to the sale, most of the
discussion revolved around the effect of the closing. The employer fully
discussed these matters and went so far as to create an employment
office so that the laid-off employees could secure other positions.
The Board found no violation of the act. They acknowledged the
fact that Fibreboard placed an employer under a duty to bargain with
his employees' representatives prior to the termination of an entire
operation and that the "management rights" clause in the contract was
not the type of clear waiver needed to relinquish the statutory right
of bargaining granted the unions. However, the Board noted the long
history of bargaining, the total harmony between the parties with
respect to the handling of the effects of the shutdown, the fact that the
unions' primary concern after the announcement was about the effects,
and the pressing economic necessity for the sale. In all these circum-
stances the Board was satisfied "that effectuation of the purposes of
the Act would not require a remedial order even if a technical violation
were found.""
It should be noted that the Mirror doctrine appears to disregard
the underlying rationale of Town & Country and Fibreboard—that
the employer, by talking with the union, may be made aware of some
cost-cutting device which could save the unit. The reason for the
Board's failure to find a violation apparently was based on the fact that
a fait accompli had occurred and, in fact, the union could not have
prevented it. Does this then mean that an employer is required to bar-
gain only about the effects of a change in operations when the decision
to change could not possibly be averted by the union? The answer is
not clear.
52 Supra note 22.
53 Georgia-Pacific Corp., supra note 22.
24 151 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965).
55 Id. at 842.
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V. DARLINGTON AND ITS IMPACT ON SECTION 8(a)(5)
In March of 1965, the Supreme Court rendered a decision which
has created considerable discussion with respect to the problems here-
tofore treated. In Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co.," the Court
decided that it is not a violation of section 8(a) (3) for an employer
to completely terminate his business for anti-union motives; neither is
it a violation of section 8(a) (3) for an employer to go partially out of
business for anti-union motives, as long as the purpose and effect is
not to "chill unionism" in the remainder of his business.'
Confronted with the successful organizing campaign of the Tex-
tile Workers Union, the Deering Milliken Company, which operated
seventeen textile manufacturing plants, determined that it would close
its Darlington plant rather than deal with the bargaining representa-
tive of its employees. The liquidation was accomplished without dis-
cussing the matter with the union. The Board found that this action
was based on anti-union animus and violated sections 8(a) (1), (3) and
(5) of the act." The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforce-
ment of the Board's order." A petition for certiorari was granted with
respect to the Board's findings relative to sections 8(a)(1) and (3).
The Supreme Court did not have before it the section 8(a) (5)
issues to which the Board had addressed itself. In a footnote, however,
the Court did refer to the Board's finding of a section 8(a) (5) viola-
tion:
The union asked for a bargaining conference on Septem-
ber 12, 1956 (the day that the board of directors voted to
liquidate), but was told to await certification by the Board.
The union was certified on October 24, and did meet with
Darlington officials in November, but no actual bargaining
took place. The Board found this to be a violation of § 8(a)
(5). Such a finding was in part based on the determination
that the plant closing was an unfair labor practice, and no
argument is made that § 8(a)(5) requires an employer to
bargain concerning a purely business decision to terminate
his enterprise. Cf. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Labor
Board. . . 80
56 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
57 Section 8(a)(3) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. . . ."
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 US.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964). Upon remand of Darlington, the
Trial Examiner found no evidence of an intent to chill unionism elsewhere by closing the
plant. 62 L.R.R. 344 (Aug. 22, 1966).
m 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 245 (1962).
59 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
60 380 U.S. at 267 n.5.
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As the Court observed, the Board had found a violation of sec-
tion 8(a)(5), relying in part on the flagrant violations of section
8(a)(3). The Board had stated:
The Trial Examiner found that Darlington's violations
of section 8(a) (3) "were so complete as to discourage and
ultimately thwart the Union from pursuing its right to bar-
gain" and were a fortiori violative of Section 8(a) (5). In his
opinion "as it is discriminatory against its employees, so
does it constitute a refusal to bargain for an employer, on the
basis of a union's campaign propaganda, oral and in writing,
concerning improved working conditions and greater pay, to
anticipate demands and compulsion to grant such demands,
and therefore to terminate its operations and avoid bargain-
ing." The Trial Examiner also found that Darlington's re-
fusal to furnish the Union with wage and related bargaining
information independently violated Section 8(a)(5). We
adopt these findings of the Trial Examiner. We find further
that Darlington's refusal to bargain collectively with respect
to the employees' tenure of employment was in derogation of
the Union's status as the majority representative of the
employees.'" (Footnote omitted.)
Thus, there were three section 8(a) (5) violations found by the
Board: (1) avoidance of bargaining by terminating operations for a
discriminatory purpose; (2) failure to furnish wage data and other
relevant bargaining information; (3) failure to bargain about the
employees' tenure of employment.
When the Supreme Court noted that the 8(a)(5) violation was
based in part on the closing itself being an unfair labor practice, it
could only be referring to the first of the above infractions, for the
second and third were independent of any discriminatory closing. It
is important to make this distinction, for without it one is improperly
led to conclude that the Court said that the 8(a)(5) violation was
based on a finding of an 8(a) (3) violation. The Court simply noted
that when the violation is based on the elimination and avoidance of
an atmosphere in which good faith bargaining could take place, dis-
criminatory intent, which happens to be an element of 8(a)(3), is
necessary to find a violation of 8(a)(5).
In its comment on section 8 (a) (5), the Court recognized the im-
portant fact that no argument was made that an employer was under
a duty to bargain about a purely business decision to go out of business.
This indicates a critical issue: since the argument simply was not
al 139 N.L.R.B. at 252-53. The Trial Examiner's statement appears id. at 276.
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made, nothing regarding such an obligation can or should be drawn
from the Court's opinion. Yet, as will be seen, both the Board and
courts have cited Darlington as authority in deciding 8(a) (5) viola-
dons in situations where an employer has completely or partially
terminated his business.
VI. POST-DARLINGTON CASES
Prior to the Supreme Court's Fibreboard decision, the various
federal circuit courts had viewed with disfavor Board orders which
required an employer to bargain with respect to a change in business
operations." Most courts, however, did not object to the Board's rule
requiring an employer to bargain with respect to the effects of a deci-
sion to institute such a change." The decision of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court in the Fibreboard case indicated a departure
from this policy." It was in this context that the Supreme Court ren-
dered its narrow Fibreboard decision, followed by the broad, sweeping
statements of labor policy in Darlington. The problem to be explored
at this point is what effect, if any, Darlington has on the scope of the
Fibreboard decision.
Immediately after Darlington, the Third Circuit remanded Royal
Plating" to the Board to consider the impact of Darlington on the
Board's finding that the employer had violated section 8 (a) (5) by fail-
ing to notify and bargain with the union about the decision to close one
of its two plants. The Board adhered to its original decision, emphasiz-
ing that it was concerned with a partial and not a total termination of
business. As the Board stated:
[W]e are not here faced with the question of whether a deci-
sion to go out of business completely is a mandatory subject
of bargaining. Consequently, we need not, and do not, deter-
mine the impact on that question of the Supreme Court's
bolding in the Darlington case ". . . that when an employer
closes his entire business, even if the liquidation is motivated
by vindictiveness towards the Union, such action is not an
unfair labor practice.'
The Board explained that it found nothing in Darlington "dealing
with the discriminatory partial closing of a business which warrants
withholding application of the Act's collective-bargaining provisions
to Respondent's decision to close down the Sleeker Street plant?'"
62 E.g., Jays Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961) .
63 E.g., NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 193 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
64 Supra note 45.
65 Supra note 27.
66 152 N.L.R.B. 619, 621 (1965).
67 Id. at 622.
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Indeed, the Board felt that if a management decision to partially ter-
minate a business is liable to section 8(a)(3) scrutiny, there is no
reason why such decision should not also be subject to section 8(a)(5)
scrutiny.
The Board also ruled that the employer's decision to close one
of its plants and the effects of this decision on the employees concerned
were mandatory subjects of bargaining." The fact that the decision
was economically and not discriminatorily motivated was considered
even more reason why the employer should have afforded the union an
opportunity to bargain. In response to the argument that the employer
had made a decision concerning allocation of his capital, the Board
observed that employees had been deprived of jobs and rights acquired
through the years. In the Board's view, the latter was determinative."
As has been indicated, the Supreme Court, in Darlington, had
specifically precluded any consideration of the 8(a)(5) aspects of the
case, and the Board never made an argument based on that section.
It is important to note that the factors which prompted the enactment
of section 8(a) (5) are wholly different from the reasoning and goals
of section 8(a) (3). The former requires neither a showing of illegal
motivation nor of discrimination. Its purpose is not to restrict either
party but to bring them together for discussion. Once the discussion has
taken place, the parties are under no duty to act or refrain from
acting. Section 8(a)(5) is a mediatory section which seeks, regardless
of effect or motive, to bring the parties to the bargaining table, while
section 8(a) (3) is primarily concerned with effect and motive.
Furthermore, the Court itself distinguished between the Darling-
ton situation and the problem wherein the work was transferred to
another plant." The Court also distinguished those cases, such as
NLRB v. Savoy Laundry Inc.'' and NLRB v. Missouri Transit Co., 72
where, although a part of the business has been closed, a portion of the
business remains in operation." In addition, the Court noted the pecu-
liar fact in Darlington that the employer could not hope to receive any
future benefits from his action.
Why this preoccupation with Darlington if it appears so easily
distinguishable from the Fibreboard-Town & Country problem?—sim-
ply because certain circuit courts have not found it so readily dis-
tinguishable. The Eighth Circuit, for example, relied on the Darlington
68 Ibid. In this connection, the Board cited the Railroad Telegraphers case, supra
note 43.
eo See also Carmichael Floor Covering Co., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 65 (1965).
70 380 U.S. at 272-73.
71 327 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1964).
72 250 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1957).
73 380 U.S. at 273 n.19.
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decision in both the Burn?* and Adams" cases. Judge Van Oosterhout,
who sat on the panel which heard the Adams case, wrote the Burns
opinion. In Burns, Judge Van Oosterhout distinguished Fibreboard
because, unlike the situation in Fibreboard, the cancellation of the
contract with Creighton University and the subsequent discharge of
employees was tantamount to a complete termination of a part of the
business operation. He referred to Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion to find that such an act lies at the "core of entrepreneurial con-
trol!' He then looked to Darlington to determine if the decision to
eliminate a part of an operation must be discussed with the employees'
collective bargaining representative and came to the conclusion that
the rationale of the Supreme Court in Darlington with respect to sec-
tion 8(a) (3) of the act may be applied to an 8(a) (5) situation not
specifically considered in Fibreboard. No violation of the act was found
since there was no showing of anti-union motive in the closing. Judge
Van Oosterhout concluded:
Under Darlington, the finding of lack of antiunion motivation
in closing the Omaha division for economic reasons precludes
a finding of unfair labor practice in refusing to bargain with
the Union on the cancellation of the Creighton contract and
the closing of the Omaha division."
The court appears to have completely failed to distinguish be-
tween two wholly different sections of the act. Nowhere, in either the
majority or concurring opinion of Fibreboard, is there any hint of re-
quiring a showing of anti-union animus as a prerequisite to a finding
of an 8(a) (5) violation." On the contrary, even the most limited read-
ing of that decision must indicate that no such finding is required or
contemplated. Consequently, though the Burns court might very well
be correct in concluding that Fibreboard does not control the situation
in that case, it is hard to imagine how Darlington could. In view of the
holding in Fibreboard that anti-union animus is not a prerequisite to a
finding of an 8(a) (5) violation, the Eighth Circuit's conclusion to the
contrary is a bitter pill to swallow. With respect to the argument that
Darlington sets out certain rules to be followed in partial closing situa-
tions, it is sufficient to remember that the Court was considering a
74 William J. Burns Intl Detective Agency, Inc., 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965).
75 Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), modified and enforced in part, 322
Fld 553 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 644 (1965), modified, 350
F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
76 379 U.S. at 223 (1964).
77 Supra note 74, at 902.
78 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a unilateral act during the course of
bargaining negotiations constitutes a refusal to bargain under section 8(a) (5) without
any showing of anti-union animus. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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different section of the act, which by its own words requires a showing
of anti-union animus.
Much the same tack was followed by the Eighth Circuit in its
second encounter with the Adams case!' Adhering to its original deci-
sion," the court found that "the situation in Adams Dairy is so fac-
tually distinguishable from that in Fibreboard as to take Adams Dairy
outside of the scope of the collective bargaining requirements."'
Relying on the concurring opinion in Fibreboard, the court reasoned
that a "basic operational change" occurred here "in that the dairy
liquidated that part of its business handling distribution of milk prod-
ucts. Unlike the situation in Fibreboard, there was a change in the
capital structure of Adams Dairy which resulted in a partial liquida-
tion and a recoup of capital investment!'" The findings of a change
in basic operations and capital structure ensued from the elimination
of a phase of the employer's business. Whereas Adams Dairy had pre-
viously been engaged in the processing, sale and distribution of milk
and dairy products, it was now engaged only in the first two operations.
In effecting this change, the company sold all the trucks which had
been used in the distribution of its products to independent distributors
who took title at dockside. Once having accepted the products, the
independent distributors were no longer under the control of the com-
pany. Thus, according to the court, a limitation on such a change
"would significantly abridge [the employer's] . . . freedom to manage
[his] . . . own affairs.s 8'
The court then proceeded to quote extensively from Darlington,
emphasizing the fact that there must be an intent to "chill unionism"
before an 8(a) (3) violation can be found in a partial closing situation.
Again, the court seems to have confused the intent requirements of
section 8(a) (3) with section 8(a) (5)." As it did in Burns, the court
here disregarded the Supreme Court's specific statement to the effect
that it was not deciding an 8(a) (5) issue in Darlington.
One other point should be noted. In neither Adams nor Burns did
7° 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965).
80 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963).
81 350 F.2d at 110.
82 Id. at 111. Cf. Young Motor Truck Serv. Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1966). In
that case, the employer sold one of his two operations and transferred the other without
prior bargaining or notice. In overruling the Trial Examiner's finding that there was
no 8(a)(5) obligation to bargain about the decision, the Board said that "in making
these findings, the Trial Examiner made certain erroneous interpretations of the Act,
such as that Section 8(a)(5) does not impose any obligation on an employer to refrain
from unilateral action with respect to a proposed sale or transfer of his business."
Id. at 2.
83 350 F.2d at 111. This position became dictum since the court subsequently found
that even if bargaining was required, such bargaining actually occurred.
• 	 84 See text accompanying note 77 supra.
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the Eighth Circuit discuss the Supreme Court's emphasis in Darlington
on the fact that the employer's cessation of business did not result in
any economic benefit to him. In both Adams and Burns the converse
was true: both employers secured financial savings by changing their
operations.
One other case worthy of mention at this point is Royal Plating,"
not only because of the emphasis placed on Darlington, but also be-
cause the Third Circuit held that the NLRB could not require an
employer to bargain about a partial cessation of business.
The Third Circuit approached the issue in terms of whether a
partial termination of operations is a mandatory subject of bargaining
under section 8(d) of the act. It distinguished Fibreboard by finding
that here the employer's decision went to the heart of management
prerogative since it involved the disposition of capital. The court also
quoted at length Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibre-
board, and then concluded that "an employer faced with the economic
necessity of either moving or consolidating the operations of a failing
business has no duty to bargain with the union respecting its decision
to shut down." 88 (Emphasis added.) The meaning of the court's lan-
guage is somewhat enigmatic, for it had found that the employer's
decision was not really voluntary since the housing authority could
have condemned the property, and that the only topic for negotiations
would have been a move to another location. If the court, by the phrase
"economic necessity," meant "no choice" in view of the condemnation
threat, then it is difficult to see how anyone would impose an obligation
to bargain, since there would be nothing about which to bargain. In-
deed, one may wonder whether Fibreboard principles are relevant to
a situation where there has been no real decision made by the em-
ployer. Although the court's ultimate conclusion may be correct, it
would seem to be disregarding the restrictive majority view of the
Supreme Court in favor of the views taken by the minority of three
Justices.
The Fifth Circuit has also had an opportunity to consider the
applicability of Darlington and Fibreboard to the Town & Country
doctrine. In NLRB v. American Mfg. Co.," this court arrived at a
different conclusion from the courts in Adams, Burns, and Royal Plat-
ing. On facts very similar to those in Town & Country, the court en-
forced the Board's order requiring the employer to bargain with the
union, but did not compel the employer to resume discontinued opera-
tions. As a manufacturer of oilfield pumping equipment, the employer
85 Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 545 (1964), remanded, 350 F.2d 191
(3d Cir. 1965), afPd on remand, 152 N.L.R.B. 619 (1965).
86 350 F.2d at 196.
87 351 Fad 74 (5th Cir. 1965), enforcing in part 139 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962).
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operated a fleet of delivery trucks. The transportation department was
unilaterally abolished and the work subcontracted, partly for anti-
union motives and partly because of problems with the Interstate
Commerce Commission. 88
 The Board had found a violation of section
8(a) (3) in the discriminatory abolition of the trucking operations, and
of section 8(a) (5) in the failure to bargain about the decision to sub-
contract. The court affirmed the 8(a)(3) violation, reasoning that
Darlington supports such , a finding where a partial closing is accom-
panied by anti-union motive." Fibreboard supported the finding of
an 8(a) (5) violation, in the court's view, even absent anti-union mo-
tive.°°
It should be noted that in the present case about $150,000 of
capital investment was involved. The court felt this expenditure did
not warrant a different result, however, for the same work was being
done by an independent contractor. Yet the court considered the em-
ployer's investment to be of critical significance as far as the Board
remedy ordering resumption of the trucking operation was concerned.
Remanding this remedial order to the Board, the court stated:
This is not the simple case where resumption of the former
operation is little more than the old employee picking up the
broom and starting to sweep where the contractor left off.
We are here concerned with an order, which if enforced,
would require an Employer to purchase a fleet of trucks and
all related equipment necessary to operate a large transporta-
tion department."
The court then pointed out that "to require bargaining is not to re-
quire a bargain,' and that after bargaining, the company could still
maintain its position that the elimination of the transportation depart-
ment was necessary. In this court's view, capital investment is a factor
in fashioning remedy, not in determining whether the decision to divest
is a mandatory subject of bargaining as indicated by the concurring
members of the Supreme Court in Fibreboard."
An interesting parallel can be drawn between the American Mfg.
and Adams Dairy cases. In Adams, the employer ceased its trucking
88
 In 1958, American had been convicted of violating ICC safety regulations, and, in
1960, the ICC was again investigating them for similar violations. Id. at 77.
89
 Indeed, if abolition of the trucking department and subsequent subcontracting
of that work amounts to a "partial closing" within the meaning of Darlington, then
absent a showing that the purpose and effect of the closedown was to "chill unionism"
elsewhere in the plant, there would be no violation of 8(a)(3). Textile Workers v.
Darlington Mfg. Co., supra note 73, at 275.
99 351 F.2d at 80.
91 Ibid.
92
 Ibid.
93 See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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operation and hired independent contractors to do the work. In Ameri-
can, the employer's business underwent the same modification. In each
case, the employer changed his operation and gave up substantial con-
trol over the day-to-day supervision of deliveries. In each case, the
employer hired an independent third party to supply the equipment
and labor formerly under the employer's control. Since the Eighth
Circuit did not find that an 8(a) (5) violation had occurred, the deci-
sions seem to be antithetical. It would appear that the Fifth Circuit
decision is more consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Fibre-
board, for it clearly falls within the limited framework of that case.
It would also appear clear that the issue of anti-union animus is an
irrelevant consideration in determining whether an 8(a) (5) violation
exists.
The decisions in Burns and Royal Plating present more difficult
problems. In neither case was the operation in question continued by
the employer, nor did he have someone else do the work for him. Thus,
it would seem that the issues involved would not fall within the narrow
holding of Fibreboard. Whether Fibreboard precludes the imposition
of a bargaining duty in such a situation is a different question. The
majority and concurring opinions seem only to imply that most of the
Court preferred to withhold deciding tangential problems until they
arose.
VII. REMEDIES
Finding violations in the myriad of Town & Country situations
would be but a hollow determination unless accompanied by an ade-
quate remedy. Restoration of the status quo ante would be the opti-
mum solution, but in many instances this is impossible, impractical,
inequitable or unduly punitive. Innocent third parties may be in-
volved; capital assets may have been bought or sold; an operation
may have been abolished simply because the employer no longer
wanted to continue it; a plant may have been sold with no possibility
of repurchasing it, or anything comparable, in the proximate geograph-
ical area. Perhaps the employer had failed to discharge his obligation
to bargain, but was not prompted by any anti-union animus. Perhaps
the employer bargained about the effects of his decision, although not
the decision itself. Perhaps the remainder of the business would be
seriously weakened financially if the discontinued uneconomical opera-
tions were restored, and consequently other unit jobs might be jeopar-
dized. These are just examples of the numerous factors which must be
considered in fashioning a remedy that will best serve to further the
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.
The Board has been extremely cautious in ordering restoration to
the status quo ante in those instances where Town & Country viola-
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tions have been found. Indeed, because of this necessary caution, much
of the concern expressed about the Board's policies regarding decisions
about which an employer must bargain ought to be mollified. In fact,
the very considerations which Mr. Justice Stewart treated in his con-
curring opinion and which several of the circuits have treated in their
analyses of subjects appropriate for bargaining have been dealt with
by the Board in fashioning remedies. The Board has relegated such
factors as anti-union animus, third party interests and capital expendi-
tures to remedy. It would be an impossible undertaking to detail the
remedies appropriate to specific types of instances; such matters are
particularly suited to the Board's expertise on a case-by-case basis."
VIII. THE FUTURE OF TOWN & COUNTRY
The few courts which have considered the Town & Country issues
in light of Fiberboard and Darlington have reached varied conclusions.
The Eighth Circuit has generally restricted Fibreboard to the situation
in which one group of employees is substituted for another by means
of a subcontract. In that instance, this circuit would require no pre-
liminary finding of anti-union animus to establish a violation. Beyond
this limited situation, an initial finding of anti-union animus would be
essential. The Third Circuit, which has considered the problem in a
more limited context, would exclude partial shutdowns from the pur-
view of Fibreboard, although they specifically require bargaining with
respect to the effects thereof. The view taken by the Fifth Circuit
appears to be more closely allied with that of the Board, although the
factual situation presented to it involved a subcontract squarely within
the realm of Fibreboard; its views in another context remain unknown.
The Supreme Court in Fibreboard and Darlington has provided
very little guidance in this field. It has been argued, for instance, that
the latter case holds that management need not bargain a decision to
partially terminate its business." This view seems to reflect an inac-
curate reading of that case. In Darlington, the Court held that a partial
termination of business, designed to "chill unionism," was a violation
of 8(a) (3), because the employer was trying to secure future benefits
by using an economic weapon. But the implication of the opinion is
that an unnegotiated or discriminatory use of economic weapons to
secure future benefits might be violative of 8(a) (5).
Even if the Darlington doctrine is sufficiently extensive to be
considered relevant where an employer does receive economic benefit,
other Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court may now take
a less restrictive view toward Board policy than it did in Darlington.
94 See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
95 See, e.g., Royal Plating & Polishing Co. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965);
William J. Burns Intl Detective Agency v. NLRB, supra note 74.
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SPECTER OF DARLINGTON
In 1960 the Court handed down the famed Steelworkers trilogy,"
wherein they detailed a broad theory of non-interference in the labor
arbitration process. Nearly a year before Fibreboard, the Court de-
cided John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,' and stated in that case:
The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in estab-
lished principles of federal law, require that the rightful
prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their busi-
nesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be bal-
anced by some protection to the employees from a sudden
change in the employment relationship."
In light of these cases, one may wonder whether the Board's
strong policy in favor of bargaining prior to the elimination of jobs is
as incompatible with the Court's judicial philosophy as it has seemed.
It would appear just as likely that the Court may follow the philosophy
of Wiley and Steelworkers as that of Darlington in determining whether
an employer must bargain with his employees' union prior to under-
taking action which will eliminate unit jobs, whether by the replace-
ment of those employees or not.
In fact, it seems probable that the former course is the most
logical when one again considers the policy behind the limited bar-
gaining obligation of Town & Country. It also appears more likely
when one separates the remedies from the violation. Although the
Supreme Court may desire to limit the Board to remedies which do
not involve invasion of the employer's use of capital, there is no reason
to limit the finding of a violation, which does not require the invasion
of this "management prerogative." Thus, distinctions based on the re-
placement of one group of employees by another would seem to have
no valid basis except for the purposes of remedy. It is the loss of unit
jobs which should be the focal point of consideration and, if this is so,
then distinctions drawn between subcontracting and partial shutdowns
have little analytical value."
96 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
99 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
ss Id. at 549.
99 One decision which clearly results in elimination of unit work and which would
seemingly also carry an obligation of antecedent bargaining is to "wind up" a business
completely. In this unique case, however, since no future benefits can be derived, a
substantive distinction can be made which would find its basis in Darlington. Further-
more, possible remedies are de minimis, and any finding of violation would present a
moot question.
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